ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
PRESENT [1] is an ultra-lightweight block cipher, proposed by A. Bogdanov et al. in CHES 2007 for extremely constrained environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks. Differential attack [2] against 16 round PRESENT was given by Wang [3] using 2 64 chosen plaintexts, 2 32 6-bit counters and 2 64 memory accesses and it was claimed to recover 32 subkey bits by differential attack on 16 round PRESENT. In this paper, we have shown that 32 subkey bits of reduced round PRESENT cannot be recovered by this attack [4] . We have also shown that we can recover at the most 30 subkey bits by the differential attack on PRESENT reduced to 16 rounds.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief description of PRESENT. In section 3, differential attack on 16-round PRESENT given by Wang is discussed. In section 4, flaws in differential attack on PRESENT are analyzed and rectification for these flaws [4] is suggested. Section 5 concludes the paper.
DESCRIPTION OF PRESENT
PRESENT [1] is a symmetric key ultra-lightweight block cipher. It takes plaintext block of length 64 bits and produces ciphertext block of 64 bits. It consists of total 31 rounds. Based on the length of the key there are two variants of PRESENT, denoted by PRESEST-80 and PRESENT-128 with key of length 80 bits and 128 bits respectively. Brief description of the encryption process and the key schedule for PRESENT-80 is given below.
The Encryption Process
Each round of the PRESENT [1] has three layers of operations. The first layer of operations is addRoundKey described as follows:
where b j, 0 ≤ j ≤ 63 is the current state and k i,j 1 ≤ i ≤ 32, 0 ≤ j ≤ 63 is the j th subkey bit of round key K i .
The second layer of operations is sBoxLayer. PRESENT uses only one S-box S (Table 1) of length 4-bit which is applied 16 times in parallel in each round. The third layer of operations is player, the pLayer is a bit permutation layer, in which bit i of a stage is moved to bit position P(i) according to the following rule:
We omit the key schedule algorithm of PRESENT as it is not used in our analysis. Interested readers can refer to [1] for details.
Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round PRESENT [3]
Differential cryptanalysis for recovering 32 subkey bits of 16 round PRESENT-80 by using 24 14-round differential characteristics of probability 2 -62 is given by Wang.
Difference pairs for S-box
The difference distribution table ( 
Differential Characteristics [3]
24 differential characteristics for PRESENT are given by Wang [3] with the probability of each characteristic as 2 -62 . Out of the 24 differential characteristics, 20 differential characteristics have different input differences but the same output difference and 4 pairs of differential characteristics have same input difference but different difference from the output of round 2 to the input of round 8. All the characteristics have the same difference after 8 th round. All of the 24 differential characteristics have 2 active S-boxes located in the position 0,1,2,12,13 and 14, so the S-boxes in position from 3 to 11 and 15 are all non-active. According to the output difference of differential characteristics for 14-round, there are two active S-boxes in round 15 which are x 0 and x 8 , whose input difference is 9 and output differences will be 2, 4, 6, 8, 12 or 14. The least significant bit of all the possible output differences is zero; therefore at most 6 bits are non zero for the output difference of S-boxes in round 15. After pLayer of round 15, the maximum number of active Sboxes for round 16 is 6 and minimum number of active S-boxes is 2 (E-mail communication: Wang, 2009 For getting right pairs for differential cryptanalysis, we xor bits of ciphertext pairs corresponding to non-active S-boxes namely x 0 , x 1, x 2 , x 3, x 5 , x 7 , x 9 , x 11, x 13, x 15 and this sum should be zero for right pairs. After getting right pairs, bits of right pairs corresponding to active S-boxes in the last two rounds will be decrypted from 16 th round to 14 th round. 24 bits of round subkey K 17 and 8 bits of round subkey K 16 will be involved during decryption from round 16 to round 14.
RECTIFIED DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS
We found that 32 subkey bits as claimed by Wang cannot be recovered by this attack. One can recover 24 bits of round subkey K 17 and 6 bits of round subkey K 16 . Therefore at the most 30 subkey bits can be recovered by the proposed differential attack on 16 round PRESENT. This is shown graphically below in figure 1. [4] In round 16, 24 ciphertext bits corresponding to 24 bits of round subkey K 17 are extracted for right pairs and x-ored with all possible values of 24 bits of round subkey K 17 . After applying inverse pLayer, the intermediate 24 bits namely C 16, C 17, C 18, C 19, C 24, C 25, C 26, C 27, C 32, C 33, C 34, C 35, C 40, C 41, C 42, C 43 , C 48, C 49, C 50, C 51 , C 56, C 57 , C 58, C 59, will be passed through inverse S-box.
Flaws identified in Differential Cryptanalysis
In round 15, we are able to extract only 6 bits corresponding to 6 bits of round subkey K 16 from 24 bits of previous round. Extract these 6 ciphertext bits and xor these bits with all possible values of 6 bits of round subkey K 16 . After applying inverse pLayer, only 6 intermediate ciphertext bits namely C' 1, C' 2 , C' 3, C' 33, C' 34 , C' 35 are left to pass through inverse S-box. But in practice, we need 4 bits to pass through one S-box, as PRESENT uses one 4x4 S-box, which take 4 bits as input and produces 4 bits as output. These 6 bits cannot be grouped together to pass through inverse S-box. Therefore we need bits at position C' 0 and C' 36 to complete the 4 bits set to pass through inverse Sbox. For getting these two bits, either we need to decrypt additional 8 bits from 16 th round or we should be able to extract 8 intermediate ciphertext bits form 15 th round. But this is not possible due to output difference of difference distribution table for S-box in 15 th round and the possible outputs of 15 th round for input difference 1001 are all even with at the most 6 non zero bits, which leads to only 6 active S-boxes in 16 th round though we require 8 active S-boxes here. of additional two bits to complete set of 4 bits to pass through inverse S-box. After that apply inverse S-box and find out x-or of the two decrypted pairs and check whether it is the same x-or as suggested by the characteristics. If it is the same x-or value then increase the counter of the corresponding key value by 1 and the key giving the desired x-or value maximum number of times will be our correct values for the 30 subkey bits.
Rectification in Differential Cryptanalysis

Computational Complexity
As given by Wang [ For each structure, each pair should have 10 non-active S-boxes in 16 th round satisfying each characteristic. After discarding wrong pairs, for each structure the number of candidates left for right pair is 2 47 *2 -40 =2 7 .
Among 16 S-boxes in round 16, 10 S-boxes must be non-active. Among the remaining 6 Sboxes in round 16, we will consider 36 cases according to the output of the S-box in round 15. As input to round 15 S-box is 9, therefore the possible outputs from the S-box difference distribution table will be (2,2), (2,4), (2,6), (2, 8) , (2,C), (2,E), (4,2), (4,4), (4, 6) , (4, 8) , (4,C), (4,E), (6,2), (6,4), (6, 6) , (6, 8) , (6,C), (6,E), (8, 2) , (8, 4) , (8, 6) , (8, 8) , (8,C), (8,E), (C,2), (C,4), (C,6), (C,8), (C,C), (C,E), (E,2), (E,4), (E,6), (E,8), (E,C), (E,E).
If an S-box is active, the input difference to this S-box should be 1 and output difference will be 3, 7, 9 or 13 and if S-box is non-active then input and output differences will be 0. Using this filter, discard any pair with a wrong output difference. So the expected number of remaining pairs for each structure is about: We guess the 24 bits of round subkey K 17 and 6 bits of round subkey K 16 and decrypt the remaining ciphertext pairs from round 16 to round 14. There are at the most 4 pairs of occurrences for the given input difference and output difference, according to the difference distribution table of S-box for PRESENT. We denote number of active S-boxes in round 16 by t (2 ≤ t ≤ 6). We consider 5 cases according to the value of t as given in the table 3 below: where p is the probability of the differential characteristics, k is the number of subkey bits involved in decryption from 16 th to 14 th round, α is the average count of keys that are suggested per analyzed pair after excluding the wrong pairs discarded before counting and β is the fraction of analyzed pair among all pairs. Success probability [4] for µ = p*N = 2 -62 *2 63 *24 = 48 right pairs and k = 30 subkey bits involved in decryption from round 16 to round 14 is: P s = 0.999999904 Thus we can obtain 30 subkey bits with the probability 0.999999904. Time complexity is almost same as in [3] , except the time complexity of 2 50 16-round PRESENT encryptions in step 3 of the algorithm presented in [3] .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown that proposed differential attack on 16 round PRESENT [2] cannot recover 32 subkey bits of 80 bit master key. We have also shown that one can recover at the most 30 subkey bits by the differential attack with the success probability of 0.999999904. Lots of work has been done and is being done in [6] , [7] , [8] , [9] on the basis of this differential attack given by Wang [3] assuming to recover 32 subkey bits of 16 round PRESENT, therefore the rectifications made out to come to the conclusion that the number of subkey bits recoverable by this attack is exactly 30 and not 32 as claimed earlier is very important for further research.
